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Automation of response to information security incidents using dynamic playbooks and information security tools, building an attack chain and with an object-oriented approach

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Next Generation SOAR

Automation of response to information security incidents with built-in basic correlation (SIEM), vulnerability Scanner (VS), collection of raw events directly from information security tools, dynamic playbooks, building an attack chain and an object-oriented approach. AM and VM are included

AM
Asset Management

Description of the IT landscape, detection of new objects on the network, categorization of assets, inventory, life cycle management of equipment and software on automated workstations and servers of organizations

VS
Vulnerability Scanner

Scanning information assets with enrichment from any external services (additional scanners, The Data Security Threats Database and other analytical databases) to analyze the security of the infrastructure.

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Vulnerability Management

Building a process for detecting and eliminating technical vulnerabilities, collecting information from existing security scanners, update management platforms, expert external services and other solutions

FinCERT
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Bilateral interaction with the Central Bank, namely the transfer of information about incidents and receipt of prompt notifications/bulletins from the regulator

GovCERT
Government Computer Emergency Response Team

Bilateral interaction with the state coordination center for computer incidents, namely the transfer of information about incidents and receipt of prompt notifications/bulletins from the regulator

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Threat Intelligence without Myths: What TI Is Not and Why It Is Often Implemented Incorrectly

Threat Intelligence without Myths: What TI Is Not and Why It Is Often Implemented Incorrectly
27.08.2026

Atamanchuk Anastasia, Security Vision


Threat Intelligence is one of those topics in information security that everyone seems to have heard something about, but almost everyone understands it in their own way. For some, TI is just feeds with IP addresses. For others, it’s an expensive platform that “needs to be bought because everyone else is doing it.” For yet others, it’s a trendy term from CISO presentations.


The problem is that due to this mismatch of expectations, Threat Intelligence is very often implemented incorrectly. Formally, the company has TI, budgets have been spent, reports are being generated — but there’s almost no real benefit. As a result, there’s a persistent feeling that TI “doesn’t work,” is “overrated,” or is “only needed by large corporations.”


TI is not just a “database of indicators,” but it’s not magic either


Let’s start with the most important thing. Yes, modern Threat Intelligence has long moved beyond primitive lists of IP addresses, domains, and hashes. Today, there are TI platforms in which correlations, scenarios, hypotheses, and sometimes full‑fledged detections are built based on threat data. This also applies to commercial solutions — for example, in the Security Vision TIP product, indicators are used not on their own, but as part of the analysis and detection logic.


But here a dangerous illusion arises. It seems that if a platform “is capable of detecting threats,” it automatically understands what is important to us and what is not. In practice, this is almost never the case. Any detection, even the most complex one, still relies on assumptions — about the infrastructure structure, the quality of logging, the acceptable behavior of users, and the level of process maturity. And if these assumptions do not match the reality of a specific company, TI again starts either making noise or remaining silent where it was supposed to help.


Therefore, it is important to state: Threat Intelligence is not magic and not standalone protection. This is a source of knowledge that can be used in various ways. Good — if it’s done thoughtfully. Bad — if it’s done mechanically.


The most common mistake is expecting TI to do something it’s not designed for


Very often, the implementation of TI starts with the wrong question. They don’t ask “what decisions do we want to make based on TI,” but “which TI product to buy.” And then TI is used as yet another source of alerts, as a means of preventing attacks, or even as a replacement for SOC.


These are obviously false expectations.


Threat Intelligence is not designed to “prevent an attack from happening.” It does not block traffic, fix vulnerabilities, or correct architectural errors. Its task is far less flashy but far more important — to reduce uncertainty. To help understand what in the stream of events, vulnerabilities, and suspicious activity is truly significant and what is secondary.


To simplify to the essence, TI is needed not to add signals, but to better understand those that already exist.


Why indicators on their own mean almost nothing


Even today, when Threat Intelligence has become more complex, the problem with indicators hasn’t gone away — it’s just become less obvious. An IP address, domain, or hash is often perceived as something objective: either bad or good. But in reality, indicators are just traces of someone else’s experience.


Someone somewhere saw this address in an attack. At a certain point in time. In a certain context. Without understanding this context, the indicator loses its meaning. That is why, in real SOCs, you can observe a paradox: the more TI sources are connected, the less trust there is in TI alerts. Good Threat Intelligence does not answer the question “is this IP bad?” It helps answer the question “what does this mean for us — here and now?”


TI does not predict the future — and that is not its weakness


Sometimes, people expect Threat Intelligence to have almost prophetic abilities. They want TI to tell them in advance when and where an attack will occur. This expectation is especially heightened after serious incidents. But TI is not about guessing.


It works in terms of probabilities, trends, and scenarios. A good TI doesn’t say, “you’ll be attacked tomorrow at 03:14.” It says, “in your industry, such‑and‑such techniques are currently being actively used against such‑and‑such services, with such‑and‑such an entry vector.” It doesn’t sound impressive, but that’s precisely what allows you to prepare for real threats, not for an abstract “everything at once.”


Threat Intelligence cannot exist in isolation


One of the reasons why TI often “doesn’t take off” is that people try to treat it as a separate world. A separate system, a separate budget, sometimes even a separate team. At the same time, TI is barely connected to real processes: the SOC lives its own life, the architects live theirs, and vulnerability management lives its own. As a result, Threat Intelligence exists as a pretty facade. Dashboards are updated, reports are generated, but the impact on real decisions is minimal. By its very nature, TI cannot operate in a vacuum. Its value only emerges when it influences priorities, detection rules, threat hunting, and architectural decisions.


A good sign of a thriving TI is when people come to it on their own, because it’s hard to make decisions without it. A bad sign is when it has to be constantly justified and “sold” within the company.


Why TI is so often implemented formally


There is also a more mundane reason. Threat Intelligence is often implemented not because it is truly needed, but because “that’s how it’s done.” This may be a regulatory requirement, a recommendation from consultants, or simply following a trend. In such cases, no one asks themselves the basic question: which solutions should actually improve thanks to TI.


Without an answer to this question, Threat Intelligence is doomed to be formal. It will be mentioned in strategies and presentations, but it won’t become part of the day‑to‑day work of the security team.


What Threat Intelligence should actually be


If you strip away the marketing and grandiose wording, Threat Intelligence is a decision‑support mechanism. It’s needed so that security professionals can understand what’s happening faster, spend less time on irrelevant threats, and be better prepared for the attack scenarios that are actually possible.


This doesn’t mean abandoning platforms, automation, or even TI‑based detections. Modern solutions are capable of this, and that’s normal. But the key point remains the same: TI only works when it’s used as knowledge, not as automatic protection.


Results


Threat Intelligence is not overrated. It’s just too often misunderstood. It’s not a database of “all the bad stuff,” not a silver bullet, and not yet another alert generator. It’s a way to navigate threats and make more meaningful decisions.


Like any intelligence, TI is useless if it’s either stored without being used or used without understanding the context. Conversely, even relatively simple TI can be extremely useful if it’s integrated into real processes and tied to the reality of a specific organization.


If this is missing, no amount of feeds, no expensive platform, and no prestigious name will save you.

 

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